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THE MOTOR CARRIER EXCUSE

I.

INTRODUCTION

In the spring of 2016, Haskell Fuller and Micah Lindsey worked as
former employees for Two Men and a Truck Arkansas, Inc. (TMT).1 Fuller
and Lindsey’s primary job was to safely move, pack, and unpack customers’
possessions.2 Additionally, Fuller and Lindsey assisted truck drivers in
completing inspections and maneuvering trucks into docking stations.3 In
the fall of 2016, Fuller and Lindsey filed a suit against their former employer, TMT, seeking compensation for overtime.4
The court dismissed the complaint with prejudice.5 The court did not
dismiss the case because the plaintiffs failed to plead sufficient facts showing that TMT did not pay the required overtime.6 Instead, the court relied on
provisions in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)7 and a provision in the
Arkansas code8 that allow employers to deny their workers overtime.9 This
result reflects an abuse that has plagued the transportation industry for nearly a century.10
1. In re Two Men & a Truck Litig., No. 5:16-CV-05255, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26017
*4 n.3 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 24, 2017).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 3.
5. Id. at 2.
6. See id. at 17.
7. See Two Men & a Truck, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26017 at *3; Pub. L. No. 75-718,
52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1)) (providing an exemption to 29
U.S.C. § 207, which establishes maximum hours and overtime provisions, for any employee
“to whom the Secretary of Transportation has power to establish qualifications and maximum
hours of service pursuant to the provisions of section 31502 of title 49”).
8. See Two Men & a Truck, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26017 at *1; ARK. CODE. ANN. §
11-4-211 (West 2021) (stating that employers’ requirement to pay employees overtime for
working in excess of forty hours a week does not apply to “any employee exempt from the
overtime requirements of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act pursuant to the provisions of
29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1) – (24) and (b)(28) – (30), as they existed on March 1, 2006”).
9. Cf. In re Two Men & a Truck Litig., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26017 at *15–17 (discussing Arkansas authority that establishes that loaders can be denied overtime despite never
leaving the state if their employer subjects them to performing interstate moves that would
impact the safety of interstate commerce).
10. See, e.g., Levinson v. Spector Motor Serv., 330 U.S. 649, 776, 778 (1947) (holding
that an employee engaged in mostly loading or directing the loading of trucks was not entitled overtime by virtue of the Motor Carrier Act exemption); Williams v. Cent. Transp. Int’l.,
Inc., 830 F.3d 773, 778 (8th Cir. 2016); Vaughn v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 291 F.3d 900,
906 (10th Cir. 2002); Graham v. Town & Country Disposal of W. Mo., Inc., 865 F. Supp. 2d
952, 961 (W.D. Mo. 2011).
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The modern trend of employers refusing to pay transportation workers
overtime originated when the Supreme Court of the United States determined that loaders engaged in safety operations impacted interstate commerce and, under the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC), were not entitled to overtime.11 In Levinson v. Spector Motor Service,
Justice Rutledge, joined by Justice Black and Justice Murphy, offered a dissenting opinion stating that nothing in the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 (“Original MCA”)12 inhibits or forbids the operation of the maximum hour provisions13 of the FLSA.14 Despite the dissent’s appeal that the FLSA should be
applied “broadly and liberally”15 to achieve its objective of “distributing and
raising standards of employment and living[,]”16 subsequent courts have
continued to use Levinson17 to deny transportation employees overtime
compensation.18
The Motor Carrier Act exemption to the FLSA19 exists despite being
contrary to congressional intent. Congress intended the maximum hours
provision of the FLSA to eliminate the brutal conditions impacting the welfare and health of the American people.20 The maximum hour provision was
designed to foster work opportunities for the unemployed seeking work by
reducing the oppressive work hours of the employed.21
The disparate impact of the Motor Carrier Act exemption has significant implications for Arkansas. Arkansas has 86,860 trucking industry
jobs.22 Over eight percent of Arkansas’s workforce is engaged in the trucking industry,23 which is the highest concentration of trucking industry jobs
for any state in the United States.24 Nearly 33,000 Arkansans are employed
11. Levinson, 330 U.S. at 685 (forbidding a loader-employee from recovering overtime
from his prior employer because his duties affected the safety of motor carrier operations and
therefore fell under the Motor Carrier Exemption to the FLSA).
12. Pub. L. No. 74-255, 49 Stat. 543 (1935).
13. Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060, 1063–65 (1938).
14. Levinson, 330 U.S. at 686.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 685.
18. See, e.g., Bilyou v. Dutchess Beer Distribs., Inc., 300 F.3d 217, 229 (2d Cir. 2002);
Resch v. Krapf’s Coaches, Inc., 785 F.3d 869, 875 (3d Cir. 2015); Songer v. Dillon Res.,
Inc., 618 F.3d 467, 474 (5th Cir. 2010); Alexander v. Tutle & Tutle Trucking, Inc., 834 F.3d
866, 872 (8th Cir. 2016).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1).
20. 81 CONG. REC. 7847, 7848 (1937) (statement of Sen. Healy).
21. Id.
TRANSP.
RSCH.
INST.,
ARKANSAS
TRUCKING
FAST
FACTS,
22. AM.
https://l8r.63b.myftpupload.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/TruckingFastFacts_AR.pdf
(last updated Dec. 2018).
23. Id.
24. Id.
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as truck drivers,25 and Arkansas’s transportation industry accounts for an
even larger share of the state’s total payrolls.26 Additionally, Arkansas is
home to transportation giants J.B. Hunt27 and ABF Freight.28
While large carriers are prevalent in Arkansas, over ninety percent of
Arkansas trucking companies operate twenty or fewer trucks. 29 The end result has been nothing less than a “truckathon”30 that results in Arkansas
truck drivers performing work in exchange for sweatshop wages. The surplus of truck drivers and the reduction of wages contradicts the FLSA’s purpose to provide more opportunities for those seeking work. Arkansas’s
unique position as the state with the highest concentration of trucking industry jobs31 places it at the forefront of the battle to provide the trucking industry with fair labor standards.
This Note explores the history, inequity, and application of the Motor
Carrier Act exemption to the FLSA.32 Part II of this Note examines the history of the Motor Carrier Act.33 Part III of this Note disputes that Congress
intended to exclude transportation employees from overtime.34 Part IV illustrates how the courts fail to fairly apply the MCA exemption 35 by exploring
the Eighth Circuit Baouch decision.36 Part V argues that truck drivers are
never truly off-duty and concludes that truck drivers should be paid for eve-

25. Id.
26. Id.
27. SJ CONSULTING GROUP, TOP 25 TRUCKLOAD AND LTL CARRIERS, J. COM 41 (Mar. 18,
2019)
http://jindel.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/2018-Top-50-TL-and-LTL-CarriersSJC.pdf (stating J.B. Hunt was the third largest truckload carrier in the United States in
2018).
28. Fifteen ATA Members Make Top 100, ARK. TRUCKING ASS’N. (July 22, 2015),
https://www.arkansastrucking.com/newsinbrief/341-fifteen-ata-members-make-top-100 (stating that in 2015, ABF Freight was the seventh largest less-than-truckload carrier in the United States, and five Arkansas companies were in the Top 100 carriers by gross revenue in
North America).
29. Trucking’s Impact, ARK. TRUCKING ASS’N., https://www.arkansastrucking.com/
about/impact (last visited Aug. 6, 2020).
30. See 79 CONG. REC. 12212 (1935) (statement of Rep. Monaghan) (stating his concerns
about an oversupply of truck drivers that results in a “truckathon,” which is described as the
“brutal, inhumane, and dangerous practice” where drivers work eighteen- to twenty-hour
days to the detriment of their health). The high concentration of primarily small, locally
owned trucking companies eliminates the ability of truck drivers to unionize and seek higher
wages, which, in effect, exacerbates the impact of the MCA exemption. See 81 Cong. Rec.
7848 (1937) (statement of Sen. Healy).
31. AM. TRANSP. RSCH. INST., supra note 22.
32. Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1)).
33. See infra Part II.
34. See infra Part III.
35. 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1).
36. See infra Part V.

400

UA LITTLE ROCK LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

ry hour they are in the truck.37 Finally, Part VI appeals to the Arkansas General Assembly to follow in the footsteps of other states that have amended
their state laws38 to preempt federal law39 by removing the Motor Carrier
Act exception from Arkansas’s statutory language.40
II.

HISTORY OF THE MOTOR CARRIER ACT

In 1935, Congress passed the Motor Carrier Act to regulate truck drivers’ hours.41 With this Act, Congress’s intent was to increase safety,42 promote an economically sound trucking industry, and ensure highway transportation would always progress.43 First, this Section will explore the origins
of the ICC. Second, it will examine the history of the Original MCA. Lastly,
it will discuss the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 (MCA) and the impact of deregulation on the trucking industry.
A.

The Birth of the Interstate Commerce Commission

In the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court of the United States
in Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, held that Illinois violated the
Commerce Clause when it acted to set price ceilings on the rates charged by
railroads.44 In turn, Congress created the ICC in 188745 because multiple
states that had been previously regulating railroads were prohibited from
continuing the practice by the Wabash decision.46 The broad design of the
ICC led to courts initially interpreting it to cover only railroads.47 In re37. Id.
38. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 95-25-14(a)(1)(c) (West 2020) (providing the
North Carolina MCA exemption to FLSA); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 279:21(VIII)(b) (West
2020) (exempting New Hampshire employees covered by MCA from overtime); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 44-1204(c)(1) (West 2020) (exempting Kansas employees covered by MCA from
overtime); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 608.018(3)(f) (West 2020); see also infra Part VI.
39. See Pettis Moving Co. v. Roberts, 784 F.2d 439, 441 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 201 et. seq.)) (holding that state laws requiring overtime for all employees cannot be superseded by the FLSA).
40. See infra Part VI.
41. Pub. L. No. 74-255, 49 Stat. 543, 546 (1935).
42. 74 CONG. REC. 12211 (1935) (statement of Rep. Crawford).
43. See id. at 12204 (statement of Rep. Sadowski).
44. Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. v. Ill., 118 U.S. 557, 577 (1886) (holding that railroad
transportation is of national character and if it is to be regulated, then only the Congress of
the United States should have the authority to do so through utilization of the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution).
45. Pub. L. No. 49-41, 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
46. Wabash, 118 U.S. at 577.
47. Jurgen Basedow, Common Carriers Continuity and Disintegration in U.S. Transportation Law, 13 TRANSP. L. J. 1, 21 (1983).
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sponse, Congress passed the Hepburn Act in 190648 to guarantee that ICC
regulations extended to facilities and other services involved in railroad
transportation logistics.49
In 1906, President Roosevelt commented that the Hepburn Act’s
amendment of the ICC “has rather amusingly falsified the predictions, both
of those who asserted that it would ruin the railroads and of those who asserted that it did not go far enough and would accomplish nothing.”50 The
President stated that regulation of the railroads would “tend to put a stop to
the securing of inordinate profits by favored individuals at the expense of
the general public, the stockholders, or the wageworkers.”51 Following that
declaration, he stated, “[o]ur effort should be not so much to prevent consolidation as such, but so to supervise and control it as to see that it results in
no harm to the people.”52
B.

The History of the Motor Carrier Act

The increased regulations on railroad companies, which were unforeseeable at the time of the Hepburn Act’s passage in 1906, swung the door
wide open for a newly emerging trucking industry.53 One scholar estimated
that total railway freight decreased by nearly half from 1920 to 1930.54 The
increased competition by the trucking industry can also be attributed to the
Supreme Court’s holding in Buck v. Kuykendall.55 The Court in Buck held
that the State of Washington’s refusal to allow Mr. Buck to engage in interstate transportation services limited competition in violation of the Commerce Clause, and this holding ushered in an era of monopolistic protection
of the trucking industry.56 The Court’s decision directly impacted the forty
states that previously required common carriers to obtain a certificate to
drive on state highways.57 In turn, Congress expanded the authority of the
48. Pub. L. No. 59-337, 34 Stat. 584 (1906).
49. Basedow, supra note 47, at 21.
50. Theodore Roosevelt, Sixth Annual Message, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Dec. 3,
1906), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/sixth-annual-message-4.
51. Id.
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. See generally Paul Stephen Dempsey, Transportation: A Legal History, 30 TRANSP.
L. J. 235, 268–69 n.317 (2003) (providing the historical origins of the trucking industry);
Pub. L. No. 59-337, 34 Stat. 584 (1906).
54. John J. George, Federal Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 21 CORNELL L. REV. 249, 249–
50 (1936).
55. Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 316 (1925). Prior to this holding, a common
carrier would be required to apply for a certificate in each state that it planned to transport
persons or freight. Id. at 312–13.
56. Id.
57. Charles A. Webb, Legislative and Regulatory History of Entry Controls on Motor
Carriers of Passengers, 8 TRANSP. L.J. 91, 92 (1976).
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ICC58 to include the trucking industry and to protect railroad companies’
revenues from “destructive competition.”59
The decision in Buck can be directly attributed to the Original MCA.60
Congress passed the Original MCA because it was concerned that the low
barriers of entry for incoming truck drivers would result in truck drivers
driving merely for gas money or to make payments on the truck.61 The Federal Coordinator of Transportation, testifying to the Senate on a set of bills
slated to become the Original MCA, stated that “[t]he most important thing,
I think, is the prevention of an oversupply of transportation; in other words,
an oversupply which will sap and weaken the transportation system rather
than strengthen it.”62
The Original MCA included a provision allowing the ICC to establish a
reasonable limit on the maximum hours employees could work.63 Particularly relevant to the hours of service requirement was Congress’s concern
about highway safety and the inhumane treatment of workers who sometimes worked twenty hours a day and an upwards of 120 hours a week.64
Representative Monaghan coined the term “truckathon,” referring to the
inhumane and brutal practice that endangered the welfare of the traveling
public and the health of the truck drivers.65
Section 206(a) of the Original MCA allowed the ICC to grant new and
existing motor carriers “magic pieces of paper” required for a trucker to
engage in interstate commerce.66 The Court defended this portion of the
Original MCA because it believed the industry was economically unstable
due to ease of entry and overcrowding caused by smaller companies.67 The
Court stated that Congress was “compelled to require authorization for all
interstate operations to preserve the motor transportation system from over-

58. See Motor Carrier Act, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-255, 49 Stat. 543 (1935).
59. Basedow, supra note 47, at 28–29; Dempsey, supra note 53, at 239, 241–42.
60. Webb, supra note 57, at 91–92.
61. William E. Thoms, Rollin’ On . . . To a Free Market Motor Carrier Regulation
1935–1980., 13 TRANSP. L. J. 43, 48 (1983).
62. Id. (citing Hearings on S. 1629, S. 1632, and S. 1635 Before the Senate Committee
on Interstate Commerce, 74th Cong., 78 (1935)) (emphasis added).
63. Pub. L. No. 75-255, § 204(a), 49 Stat, 543, 546 (1935).
64. 79 CONG. REC. 12212 (1935) (statement of Rep. Monaghan).
65. Id.
66. Jonathan C. Rose, Surface Transportation and the Antitrust Laws: Let’s Give Competition a Chance, 8 TRANSP. L. J. 1, 7 (1976) (stating that some consider the certificates of
operating rights the ICC granted to motor carriers under the Original MCA as “golden eggs”
because they had an average annual return of sixteen percent).
67. Am. Trucking Ass’ns. v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 312 (1953).
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competition, while at the same time protecting existing routes through the
‘grandfather’ clause.”68
C.

The Impact of Deregulation on the Trucking Industry

Calls for deregulation, mostly for increases in competition,69 which
would likely reduce transportation costs, began to echo louder throughout
the 1970s.70 Congress responded with the Motor Carrier Act of 1980 that
instructed the ICC to promote efficiency and competitiveness throughout the
transportation industry.71 As a direct result, the number of new trucking
companies increased dramatically, more than doubling from 1980 to 1990.72
The “golden certificates” once worth hundreds of thousands of dollars were
rendered worthless by the MCA of 1980.73 In an ultimate act of deregulation, Congress passed the ICC Termination Act of 1995, which eliminated
the ICC and allowed the free market to set freight rates.74
The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 had dire consequences for large carriers.75 About half the carriers with over one million in annual revenues went
bankrupt, resulting in the loss of 175,000 jobs.76 Deregulation resulted in the
dislocation of more than half the freight industry’s employees.77 Most transportation employees stayed in the industry but ended up taking jobs that
paid half their previous wages despite working longer hours than before the
68. Id. at 312–13 (providing that certificates would grant a transportation provider the
ability to transport goods from one to city to another, but not necessarily the other way
around. The certificates essentially granted carriers a one-way ticket to deliver goods).
69. See Rose, supra note 66, at 8.
70. MARK H. ROSE ET AL., THE BEST TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM IN THE WORLD:
RAILROADS, TRUCKS, AIRLINES, AND AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY,
133 (2006) (“Starting in the 1970s, Presidents Richard M. Nixon, Gerald R. Ford, and Jimmy
Carter looked to deregulation of transportation and other industries as a device that would
reduce the costs of production and consumption in an economy characterized by fast-rising
prices and fast-rising unemployment—the dreaded stagflation.”).
71. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Congressional Intent and Agency Discretion Never the
Twain Shall Meet: The Motor Carrier Act Of 1980, 58 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1, 23 (1981).
72. Thomas Gale Moore, Trucking Deregulation, LIBR. OF ECON. AND LIBERTY,
https://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/TruckingDeregulation.html (last visited Aug. 6, 2020).
73. Id. (providing that motor carriers were no longer required to have a certificate granted by the ICC to travel to a particular destination; they are considered golden certificates
because they would often be the largest asset on a transportation company’s balance sheet,
worth more than their trucks).
74. Pub. L. No. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803 (1995).
75. MICHAEL H. BELZER, SWEATSHOPS ON WHEELS: WINNERS AND LOSERS IN TRUCKING
DEREGULATION 41 (2000) (stating that carrier bankruptcies were a result of new entrants into
the market, mostly small trucking operations that lacked the overhead of existing carriers).
76. Id. (stating that for many existing carriers, the ICC-granted certificates were the
largest asset on their balance sheet).
77. Id.
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industry was deregulated.78 Ultimately, the fears brought up by Congress
over a century ago79 when they decided to regulate the freight industry have
now come to fruition, with many truckers working sixty-five hours a week
while spending nearly three weeks on the road every month.80
III.

THE ORIGIN AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF THE MCA EXEMPTION

A few years after passing the Original MCA, Congress passed the
FLSA.81 The maximum hours provision within the FLSA stated that no employer that produced goods or was otherwise engaged in commerce could
work its employees longer than forty hours a week.82 The provision also
implemented a “penalty of paying more wages”83 for employers who required employees to work more than forty hours a week.84 However, the
FLSA provided an exception, stating that if the ICC had the power to establish maximum hours of service for the employee, then the forty-hour workweek and overtime provisions did not apply.85 This is how the MCA exemption to the FLSA was born.86
In Southland Gasoline Co., the Court held that the language of the
MCA exemption barred truck drivers from the overtime provisions of the
FLSA.87 In Levinson, the Court applied the MCA exemption to the FLSA to
loaders and driver helpers,88 basing its reasoning on the decision it had made
in Southland Gasoline Co. v. Bayley.89
This Section will first discuss how Southland failed to fully consider
the Congressional Record when it held that Congress intended to exempt
truck drivers from the maximum hours provision of the FLSA.90 Next, it will
consider the original Senate Bill before it was stalled in the House Rules
Committee. It will then examine the meaning of the “oppressive workweek”
and Fair Labor Standard as discussed by the House the winter before the
passing of the FLSA. Then, this Section will conclude with thoughts on the
78. Id.
79. See 79 CONG. REC. 12212 (1935) (statement of Rep. Monaghan).
80. BELZER, supra note 75, at 42.
81. See generally Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 201
et. seq.).
82. Id. § 7, 52 Stat. at 1063 (stating that overtime is due for a workweek over forty
hours, three years after the enactment date of the Bill).
83. 81 CONG. REC. 7655 (1937) (statement of Sen. Walsh).
84. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 207); see explanatory parenthetical, supra note 82.
85. Id. at § 13(b)(1), 52 Stat. at 1068.
86. See Southland Gasoline Co. v. Bayley, 319 U.S. 44, 48–49 (1943).
87. Id. at 48–50; see also BELZER, supra note 75, 48–49.
88. Levinson v. Spector Motor Serv., 330 U.S. 649, 685 (1947).
89. Id. at 686; see generally Southland Gasoline Co., 319 U.S. 44.
90. Southland Gasoline Co., 319 U.S. 44 at 49.
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true legislative intent behind the MCA exemption. Finally, this Section will
explore the consequences of the decisions in Southland Gasoline Co.91 and
Levinson.92
A.

Southland Merely Scratches the Surface of the Congressional Record

The Southland Court held that employees covered by the Original
MCA could not recover overtime, as required under the FLSA.93 The Court
determined that the congressional purpose of the FLSA was to expand employment and to maintain the health of American workers.94 The Court justified the MCA exemption by holding that Congress was relying on the Motor
Carrier Act’s provisions to govern the safety of motor carrier employees. 95
The Court reasoned that Congress did not intend to burden motor carriers
with overtime pay requirements so as to prevent their hours of service from
being regulated by two separate federal agencies.96
Justice Black, who joined the majority, was a member of the U.S. Senate before being appointed to the Supreme Court.97 As a member of the Senate, Justice Black co-sponsored the Black-Connery Bill, which was eventually amended into the FLSA.98 To justify the opinion, the Court in Southland
cites to the only instance in the record where truck drivers are mentioned.99
The conversation cited includes a statement made by Justice Black before he
was appointed to the Court.100 The conversation101 revolves around an
amendment that exempted transportation employers from the maximum
hour provisions of Senate Bill 2475 if they were under the authority of the
ICC.102 The amendment ensured that transportation employers, under the
authority of the ICC, would still be accountable for the wage provisions of
the Bill.103

91. Id.
92. Levinson, 330 U.S. at 685.
93. Southland Gasoline Co., 319 U.S. at 49.
94. Id. at 48.
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing 81 CONG. REC. 7875 (1937)).
97. Dennis J. Hutchinson, Hugo Black Among Friends, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1885, 1888
(1995); Seth D. Harris, Conceptions of Fairness and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 18
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 19, 138 (2000).
98. Deborah C. Malamud, Engineering the Middle Classes: Class Line-Drawing in New
Deal Hours Legislation, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2212, 2287–88 (1998).
99. Southland Gasoline Co., 319 U.S. at 48–49 (citing 81 CONG. REC. 7875 (1937)).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See 81 CONG. REC. 7875 (1937).
103. Id.
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The Original Senate Bill Before it was Amended

The conversation cited in Southland took place before Senate Bill 2475
passed on July 31, 1937.104 Senate Bill 2475 would have passed in the House
and been signed into law had it not been bottled up in the House Rules
Committee.105 Senator Black stated during negotiations on Senate Bill 2475
that he would have found it unwise to trust the responsibility for regulating
hours to two separate governmental agencies.106
Shortly after Senator Black’s response, another senator raised a concern regarding the wages of the truck drivers in his home state, some of
whom were only earning twenty cents an hour.107 Yet, the concerned senator
was assured by the drafter of the amendment that the Bill would resolve his
worry regarding wages.108 Senator Moore stated that his amendment only
sought to leave the ICC the ability to fix hours for truck drivers and that the
amendment had nothing to do with the ability to fix truck driver wages.109
This was followed by Senator Black stating that Senator Moore’s amendment would ensure that the minimum wage provision covered trucking
company employees from the maximum hours provision.110
Notwithstanding the fact that the FLSA enacted a minimum wage of
twenty-five cents an hour during the first year after its enactment,111 further
evidence exists that disputes the holding in Southland.112 Specifically, there
is evidence that Congress did not intend to exempt transportation employees
from overtime.113
C.

The Oppressive Workweek and Fair Labor Standard

Senate Bill 2475 contained separate provisions for minimum wages,
maximum hours, and overtime.114 Section 4(c) states that a Labor Standards
Board could fix a maximum workweek.115 This provision is the portion that
Senator Moore’s amendment intended to leave with the ICC.116
104. 81 CONG. REC. 7956–57 (1937); see Southland Gasoline Co., 319 U.S. at 48–49.
105. See 83 CONG. REC. 6165–66 (1938).
106. 81 CONG. REC. 7875 (1937) (statement of Sen. Black).
107. Id. (statement of Sen. Shipstead) (20 cents an hour in 1937 is $3.86 in 2021 when
adjusted for inflation).
108. Id. (statement of Sen. Moore).
109. Id.
110. Id. (statement of Sen. Black).
111. Pub. L. No. 75-718, § 6(a)(1), 52 Stat. 1060, 1062–63 (1938).
112. Southland Gasoline Co. v. Bayley, 319 U.S. 44, 48–49 (1943).
113. See infra Part II.C, D.
114. S. 2475, 75th Cong. (1937); see 81 CONG. REC. 7750 (1937) (emphasis added).
115. S. 2475, 75th Cong. § 4(c) (1937).
116. 81 CONG. REC. at 7875 (statement of Sen. Moore).
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However, Section 6(a) expressly stated that an employer could “maintain an oppressive workweek” if he paid his employees overtime. 117 That
following spring, the term “oppressive workweek” was defined as “a workweek or workday longer than that set by order of the Board under the provisions of section 4 of the bill.”118 Section 4 contained both the minimum
wage and maximum hour provisions.119 Section 6 of the Bill explicitly exempted only apprentices, individuals with impaired capacity, some miscellaneous deductions for lodging and meals, and peak activities or emergencies from its oppressive workweek clause.120
Under the context of the same Bill, the Labor Standards Board could
impose penalties on employees for violating the minimum wage provisions
under the authority of the ICC.121 In December of 1937, the House amended
the Senate’s Bill, nearly passing the Norton Amendment.122 The Norton
Amendment would have allowed an Administrator the discretion to determine whether an employer was imposing an oppressive workweek on its
employees.123 The amendment would have allowed the administrator to
weigh factors such as one’s relationship to work, the well-being and health
of the worker, how many workers were available for employment in a certain occupation, and how many hours were generally worked in the industry
or bargained for by comparable unions.124 Employees covered by the Motor
Carrier Act would not have been excluded by the Norton Amendment.125
Additionally, Southland cited Section 1573 of the Congressional record126 in support of its opinion, but the relevant sections of Senate Bill 2475
in the record explicitly state that motor vehicle carriers are subject to the
wage provisions of the Act.127 That Bill also defined a “Fair Labor Standard”
as employment conditions preventing an oppressive wage or workweek.128
The Bill also stated that the Administrator can determine exceptions to “Fair
Labor Standard.” Nowhere in the text are motor vehicle carriers explicitly
exempted from the Fair Labor Standard.129

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 7750.
83 CONG. REC. 9250 (1938).
S. 2475, 75th Cong. § 4 (1937).
S. 2475, 75th Cong. § 6 (1937); see 81 CONG. REC. 7750 (1937).
S. 2475, 75th Cong. (1937); see 81 CONG. REC. 7750–51 (1937).
82 CONG. REC. 1605 (1937).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Southland Gasoline Co. v. Bayley, 319 U.S. 44, 49 (1943).
S. 2475, 75th Cong. (1937).
S. 2475, 75th Cong. (1937); 82 CONG. REC. 1573 (1937).
See S. 2475, 75th Cong. (1937); 82 CONG. REC. 1573 (1937).
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Furthermore, the Court in Southland compared the exemption provided
to railroad employees to motor carriers.130 Yet, evidence exists that the justification for exempting railroad employees was not based on the fact that
some employees were working for less than a satisfactory wage. 131 Rather,
members of the House felt that shortly after passage of the bill, all railroad
workers would be covered by collective bargaining agreements.132 Congress
did not wish to disturb agreements between employees and their employers.133 The FLSA explicitly states that in determining a minimum wage for
any given industry, the industry committee should consider wages established by collective bargaining agreements between employers and their
employees.134
D.

Concluding Remarks on Legislative Intent

In Southland, the Court stated it would require definitive evidence that
Congress intended private motor carriers to be entitled overtime from their
employers before they would accept the plaintiff’s arguments.135 Congress
did not want the Labor Standards Board and the ICC to have simultaneous
control over the maximum hours transportation employees could work. 136
The Senate intended the Labor Standards Board to have the ability to enforce penalties against employers, subject to the Motor Carrier Act, who
subjected employees to an oppressive workweek but failed to pay their employers overtime.137
The main purpose of the FLSA was “to provide for the establishment
of fair labor standards in employments in and affecting interstate commerce[.]”138 At no point in the record is it stated that the exemption from the
maximum hours provision would exclude employees subjected to an oppressive workweek from overtime.139 The only rational conclusion is that the
holding in Southland140 directly conflicts with the legislative intent to put an
end to “sweatshop wages,” eliminate the brutal conditions impacting the

130. Southland Gasoline Co., 319 U.S. at 49.
131. See 82 CONG. REC. 1698 (1937) (statement of the Chairman).
132. Id. (statement of Rep. Mead).
133. Id. at 1699 (statement of Rep. Griswold).
134. Pub. L. No. 75-718, § 8(c)(2), 52 Stat. 1063, 1064 (1938).
135. Southland Gasoline Co., 319 U.S. at 49–50.
136. 81 CONG. REC. 7875 (1937) (statement of Sen. Black).
137. See 81 CONG. REC. 7750–51 (1937).
138. Pub. L. No. 75-718, § 1, 52 Stat. 1060, 1060 (1938) (emphasis added).
139. See generally 82 CONG. REC. 1573–1605 (1937); see also Note, Safety and Overtime
Pay: The Motor Carrier Exemption From the FLSA, 57 YALE L. J. 1129, 1133 n.19 (1948).
140. Southland Gasoline Co., 319 U.S. at 49.
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welfare and wealth of the American people, provide more opportunities for
those seeking work, and to increase their purchasing power.141
Senator Walsh, the head of the Senate Labor Committee, answered
questions he received from his peers142 the day before the Senate voted on
the final version of Senate Bill 2475 on June 14, 1938,143 prior to sending it
to be signed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt.144 Senator Walsh stated that
under no circumstances could any industry avoid the overtime requirements
unless a collective bargaining agreement existed, or the work was seasonal,
“but even in all these cases the workday is limited to not more than 12 hours
and the workweek to not more than 56 hours.”145
E.

The Disastrous Consequences of the MCA Exemption

After the holding in Southland,146 the MCA exemption was expanded
in Levinson to deny overtime not only to drivers but also any driver-helpers,
loaders, or mechanics whose services could impact the safety of transportation.147 In Alexander, the truck drivers argued that during the recruiting process, managers told them they would stay in Arkansas.148 More importantly,
none of the truck drivers traveled outside of the State of Arkansas more than
five times and some as seldom as only once.149 Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit held that the truck drivers should have reasonably expected to be engaged in interstate travel and that the MCA exemption applied even when
interstate travel made up only a small portion of an employee’s duties.150
The truck drivers further argued that their interstate activities should fall
under the de minimis exception.151 The Eighth Circuit denied the de minimis

141. 81 CONG. REC. 7848 (1937) (statement of Sen. Healy).
142. 83 CONG. REC. 9176–77 (1938).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 9523.
145. Compare id. at 9177, with 49 C.F.R. § 395.3(b)(1)–(a)(2) (2020) (allowing truck
drivers to drive up to sixty hours a week and be on-duty for up to fourteen consecutive
hours).
146. Southland Gasoline Co. v. Bayley, 319 U.S. 44, 49 (1943).
147. Levinson v. Spector Motor Serv., 330 U.S. 649, 683, 685 (denying overtime to a
loader because a substantial portion of his duties impacted the “safety of motor carrier operation”). But see Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy
for Users, Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144 (2005) (amending the Transportation codes to
allow overtime pay for employees operating commercial vehicles 10,000 pounds or less, as
prescribed by the FLSA).
148. Alexander v. Tutle & Tutle Trucking Inc., 834 F.3d 866, 871 (8th Cir. 2016).
149. Id. at 868.
150. Id. at 871.
151. Id.; see 29 C.F.R. § 782.2(b)(3) (2020) (stating that an employee is due overtime
under the FLSA if “the continuing duties of the employee’s job have no substantial direct
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argument, instead holding that despite infrequent interstate travel, the law’s
application was not trivial to the safety of motor vehicle operations in interstate commerce.152
The holding in Alexander153 would likely shock the conscience of the
dissenting Justices in Levinson.154 Recall that the dissent in Levinson155 was
joined by the original drafter of the FLSA, Justice Black.156 The Levinson
dissenters’ concern that Congress did not intend to exclude employees from
the overtime protections of the FLSA because their employer subjected
them to spend a small portion of their time impacting interstate safety came
to full fruition in Alexander.157 Additionally, the fear that employers could
easily evade the overtime requirements by deploying their employees to
minuscule portions of interstate travel158 was realized in Morris v.
McComb.159 In Morris, overtime was denied to a common carrier where
interstate commerce accounted for less than four percent of his total trips.160
It is baffling that the Supreme Court would rule adversely to Justice
Black in regards to legislative intent when he co-wrote the original version
of the FLSA.161 The Court has misconstrued the legislative intent of keeping
two separate government agencies from regulating the hours of truck drivers162 and broadly applied the exception as a means to subject transportation
employees to an oppressive workweek without overtime compensation.163
Truck drivers were left out of the Act “to provide for the establishment of

effect on such safety of operation or where such safety-affecting activities are so trivial, casual, and insignificant as to be de minimis”).
152. Alexander, 834 F.3d at 871–72.
153. Id.
154. Levinson v. Spector Motor Serv., 330 U.S. 649 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
155. Id.
156. Hutchinson, supra note 97, at 1888.
157. Compare Levinson, 330 U.S. at 689 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (arguing that the employees spending small portions of time engaged in interstate commerce should not be excluded from overtime), with Alexander, 834 F.3d at 868, 871–72 (holding that truck drivers
that only left the state of Arkansas five or less times in a year were not entitled to overtime).
158. See Levinson, 330 U.S. at 689 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
159. See Morris v. McComb, 332 U.S. 422, 433–34 (1947) (holding with a 5-4 decision,
with Justices Murphy, Rutledge, Black and Douglas dissenting).
160. Id. at 433–34 (holding with a 5-4 decision, with Justices Murphy, Rutledge, Black
and Douglas dissenting). Justice Murphy dissented, rejecting the Court’s conception that
employees outside the authority of the commission during ninety-seven percent of their activities should be denied overtime, stating it was unjust that “it is by the slender thread of this
‘power’ that they fall within § 13(b)(1) and hence are deprived of the benefits of the Fair
Labor Standards Act.” Id. at 438–39 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
161. John S. Forsythe, Legislative History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 464, 466 (1939).
162. See 81 CONG. REC. 7875 (1937) (statement of Sen. Black).
163. See Cf. Levinson, 330 U.S. at 683–85.

2022]

THE MOTOR CARRIER EXCUSE

411

fair labor standards.”164 The failure of the Supreme Court to accurately determine legislative intent has directly resulted in harm to Arkansas transportation employees for over eighty years165 and should motivate the Arkansas
General Assembly to enact legislation to protect its citizens from the effects
of enduring judicial abuse.
IV.

INCONSISTENT JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF THE MCA EXEMPTION

In Baouch v. Werner Enterprises, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit held that per diem payments deducted from gross
wages to reduce income taxes still functioned as a wage for purposes of
minimum wage calculations under the FLSA.166 This Section will provide an
overview of how per diem payments function in relation to truck drivers.
Next, it will discuss the holding in Baouch.167 Lastly, it will discuss how
Baouch168 should have been overturned due to the court’s reliance on a section of the FLSA from which truck drivers are generally exempt.169
A.

Per Diem and Truck Drivers

The Internal Revenue Service Treasury regulations provide an accountable plan that permits employers to give tax-free reimbursements to employees.170 The reimbursements are not included as gross income and are not
subject to employment taxes.171 If per diem172 is paid under an accountable
plan (i.e., there is a business connection,173 substantiation,174 and excess
amounts paid are returned),175 then the per diem payments are not treated as

164. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, § 1, 52 Stat. 1060 (emphasis added).
165. See, e.g., In re Two Men & a Truck Litig., No. 16-CV-05255, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26017, at *17–18 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 24, 2017); Alexander v. Tutle & Tutle Trucking,
Inc., 834 F.3d 866 (8th Cir. 2016).
166. Baouch v. Werner Enters., 908 F.3d 1107, 1117–18 (8th Cir. 2018), cert. denied,
140 S. Ct. 122 (2019).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. 29 C.F.R. § 778.217(a) (2020) derives its statutory authority from 29 U.S.C. §
207(e), (h) both of which exempt truck drivers under the MCA exemption.
170. 26 C.F.R. § 1.62-2(c)(4) (2020).
171. Id.
172. See 26 C.F.R. §1.62-2(f)(2) (2020). “Per diem” refers to the transportation industry’s
practice of giving truck drivers an allowance, generally on a daily basis, that provides “for
ordinary and necessary expenses of traveling away from home[.]” Id.
173. 26 C.F.R. § 1.62-2(d) (2020).
174. Id. § 1.62-2(e).
175. Id. § 1.62-2(f).
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gross income, are not subject to withholding or employment taxes, and are
not considered wages.176
To remain competitive in the trucking industry, most employers have
adopted the tactic of paying truck drivers per diem as an incentive program.177 Employers deduct per diem from gross wages to increase takehome pay for drivers.178 Employees are able to opt-in to a per diem plan, and
the per diem deductions from gross wages will be tied to either the number
of miles driven or the number of days spent away from home. 179
Furthermore, as stated previously,180 per diem payments paid under an
accountable plan reduce gross wages and are not accounted as income for
the truck drivers.181 The consequence of the per diem arrangement, not only
in practice but also regarding public policy,182 is that it enables employers
the ability to avoid paying Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) taxes on behalf of their employees.183
B.

The Eighth Circuit’s Holding in Baouch

In Baouch, a group of Nebraska truck drivers argued in federal district
court that per diem deductions from gross pay should not be included in
their employer’s computation of minimum wage under the FLSA.184 The
drivers argued that the deductions were “genuine reimbursements for expenses[]” incurred on behalf of their employer.185 The district court relied in
part on an Eighth Circuit opinion regarding firefighters 186 and a Tenth Circuit opinion regarding seismic-mapping employees187 to conclude that the
176. Id. 1.62-2(h) (emphasis added).
177. Cf. Baouch v. Werner Enters., 908 F.3d 1107, 1118 (8th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 140
S. Ct. 122 (2019).
178. Cf. id.
179. Cf. id. at 1111.
180. See supra text accompanying notes 165–75.
181. 26 C.F.R. § 1.62-2 (2020).
182. Bond v. Comm’r of Revenue, 691 N.W.2d 831, 837 (Minn. 2005) (stating that the
intention of Congress when enacting the Social Security Act was to provide insurance for the
“security of the men, women, and children of the Nation against certain hazards and vicissitudes of life”) (quoting Economic Security Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and
Means, 74 Cong. 1st Sess. at 13 (1935) (Message From the President of the United States
Transmitting a Recommendation for Legislation on the Subject of Economic Security).
183. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 3101 (stating the tax rate for FICA), with 26 C.F.R. § 1.622(h) (stating that the per diem paid under an accountable plan is not to be treated as wages
and is therefore not subject to withholding taxes).
184. Baouch v. Werner Enters. Inc., 244 F. Supp. 3d 980, 990 (D. Neb. 2017).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 991, 993; see generally Acton v. City of Columbia, 436 F.3d 969 (8th Cir.
2006).
187. Baouch, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 992; see generally Sharp v. CGG Land (US), Inc., 840
F.3d 1211 (10th Cir. 2016).

2022]

THE MOTOR CARRIER EXCUSE

413

per diem paid to the truck drivers was more akin to a wage than a true travel
expense or per diem reimbursement.188
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding, reiterating that the net pay the truck drivers received was strikingly similar to
that of the truck drivers who opted out of the per diem plan.189 This finding
supported the conclusion that the drivers were compensated for the time
they worked because their wages were similar to those who opted out.190 The
court recognized the requirement for employers to pay a minimum wage.191
Yet, it also cited the exclusions, finding that reimbursements for travel expenses for the employer’s benefit are not included as part of the regular
rate.192 The court found that reimbursements for travel expenses that benefit
the employee can be included as part of the regular rate if the employer increases the employee’s regular rate by doing so.193 The court held that the
per diem deductions from gross wages continued to function as wages.194
Accordingly, per diem payments could be included within an employer’s
minimum wage calculation because they were payments made for hours of
employment.195
C.

The Supreme Court Should Have Granted Certiorari and Overturned
Baouch

The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska’s holding
in Baouch relies exclusively upon statutory provisions and definitions that
are not applicable to truck drivers engaged in interstate commerce.196 The
plaintiffs and the district court failed to acknowledge that the plain language
of the MCA exemption197 spared truck drivers from the maximum hour provisions of the FLSA.198 The court utilized the “[r]eimbursement for expenses” section of the regulations199 in its holding.200 However, the court failed to
188. Baouch, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 993.
189. Baouch v. Werner Enters. Inc., 908 F.3d 1107, 1118 (8th Cir. 2018).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1114–15.
192. Id. at 1113–14 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 207).
193. Id. at 1115 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 778.217(d) (2018)).
194. Id. at 1118.
195. Baouch, 908 F.3d at 1118.
196. Compare id. at 1114–18 (relying on Section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 and 29 C.F.R. § 778.217), with 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1) (stating that the provisions of
Section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 do not apply to employees covered by the
Motor Carrier Act).
197. 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1).
198. 29 U.S.C. § 207; cf. Alexander v. Tutle & Tutle Trucking, Inc., 834 F.3d 866 (8th
Cir. 2016).
199. 29 C.F.R. § 778.217 (2020).
200. Baouch, 908 F.3d at 1002–03.
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acknowledge that the particular regulation they cited201 derives its statutory
authority from the maximum hours provision that defines both the regular
rate202 and the provision detailing credits toward the minimum wage.203
Truck drivers are exempt from both provisions by virtue of the MCA exemption.204 Baouch is distinguishable from the cases cited by the district
court because neither of those classes of employees is generally covered by
the MCA exemption to the FLSA.205
Furthermore, when the plaintiffs appealed to the Eighth Circuit, the
court also ignored the relevance of the MCA exemption.206 The Eighth Circuit used the same language included within the maximum hours provision
of the FLSA207 to deny truck drivers the ability to exclude per diem wages
paid under an accountable plan208 when configuring truck drivers’ hourly
wages under the FLSA.209 The court openly acknowledged that the FLSA
requires employers to pay their employees the statutory minimum wage.210
Yet the court relied on the maximum hours provision of the FLSA to define
the regular rate211 and failed to acknowledge that truck drivers are exempt
from all provisions of Section 7 of the FLSA.212 Recall that Alexander, decided just a year earlier by the same court, held that truck drivers could not
claim overtime because the plain language of the MCA exemption213 excused them from all sections of the maximum hours provision.214

201. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 778.217 (2020)).
202. 29 U.S.C. § 207(e).
203. 29 U.S.C. § 207(h).
204. 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1) (stating that provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 207 do not apply to
employees covered by the Motor Carrier Act).
205. Baouch, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 992 (citing Acton v. City of Columbia, 436 F.3d 969,
969, 977 (8th Cir. 2006); Sharp v. CGG Land (US), Inc., 840 F.3d 1211, 1216 (10th Cir.
2016)).
206. 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1) (stating that provisions of 29 U.S.C. § 207 do not apply to
employees covered by the Motor Carrier Act).
207. 29 U.S.C. § 207(e)(2) ([T]he ‘regular rate’ at which an employee is employed shall
be deemed to include all remuneration for employment paid to, or on behalf of, the employee,
but shall not be deemed to include . . . (2) payments made for occasional periods when no
work is performed due to vacation, holiday, illness, failure of the employer to provide sufficient work, or other similar cause; reasonable payments for traveling expenses, or other expenses, incurred by an employee in the furtherance of his employer’s interests and properly
reimbursable by the employer; and other similar payments to an employee which are not
made as compensation for his hours of employment[.] . . .”).
208. 26 C.F.R. § 1.62-2(c)(2) (2020).
209. Baouch, 244 F. Supp. 3d at 1118.
210. Id. at 1114.
211. Id.
212. See id; 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1) (2018).
213. Id.
214. See Alexander v. Tutle & Tutle Trucking, Inc., 834 F.3d 866, 868 (8th Cir. 2016).
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In Baouch, the court failed to unearth relevant statutory authority215 and
followed the test used by the lower court, stating that to determine whether
“the [per diem] [p]ayments should be excepted from the regular rate calculation, [courts must evaluate] (1) whether the [p]ayments were reimbursements for expenses incurred solely for Werner’s benefit or convenience; and
(2) whether the [p]ayments approximated actual expenses.”216 The Eighth
Circuit, in its misguided attempt to dive deeper, used the Department of Labor (DOL) Handbook for guidance, citing its provision that states “[i]f the
amount of per diem or other subsistence payment is based upon and thus
varies with the number of hours worked per day or week, such payments are
a part of the regular rate in their entirety.”217
However, the relevant chapter cited by Baouch is labeled “Overtime,”218 and the general rule under the subsection labeled “[r]eimbursement
of employee expenses”219 cites to 29 CFR 778.217 in subsection (a).220 Thus,
it can be inferred that the DOL’s entire guidance relevant to this portion is
based on the DOL’s statutory authority given to it by 29 U.S.C. § 207,221 a
section that truck drivers are exempt from due to the plain language of the
MCA exemption.222
Therefore, the Supreme Court should have granted certiorari and overturned the holding in Baouch223 because truck drivers, and “any employee
with respect to whom the Secretary of Transportation has power to establish
qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of
section 31502 of title 49”224 are exempt from 29 U.S.C. § 207.225 Because
transportation employees are exempt from the provision for maximum
hours, the definitions of the regular rate as described in Section 207 do not
apply to them,226 nor does any DOL regulation that derives its authority from

215. 29 C.F.R. § 778.217(a) (2020) derives its statutory authority from 29 U.S.C. §
207(e), (h) (2018) both of which truck drivers are exempt from by virtue of the MCA exemption.
216. Baouch v. Werner Enters. Inc., 908 F.3d 1107, 1116 (8th Cir. 2018).
217. U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. WAGE & HOUR DIV., FIELD OPERATIONS HANDBOOK,
REIMBURSEMENT FOR EMPLOYEE EXPENSES § 32(d)(05)(a),(c), (Nov. 17, 2016)
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/field-operations-handbook/Chapter-32#B32d05 [hereinafter WAGE AND HOUR HANDBOOK].
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See id.
222. See Alexander v. Tutle & Tutle Trucking, Inc., 834 F.3d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 2016)
(citing 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1)).
223. Baouch v. Werner Enters., 908 F.3d 1107, 1118 (8th Cir. 2018).
224. 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1).
225. See Baouch, 908 F.3d at 1118.
226. See id.; 29 U.S.C. § 207(e).
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Section 207227 or a DOL handbook that also relies upon the same authority.228 Due to these limitations, the holding in Baouch229 is wrong. The only
interpretation of wages that should be computed when determining whether
an employer paid an employee within the bounds of the FLSA230 should be
the plain language of the IRS codifications. The IRS codifications clearly
state that per diem paid under an accountable plan are not wages.231
Baouch232 was unjust and stands as an excellent example as to why the General Assembly must enact legislation to protect Arkansas transportation employees from judicial abuse.
V.

TRUCKERS MUST BE PAID FOR EVERY HOUR THEY ARE IN THE TRUCK

In Browne v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., United States District Judge Timothy L. Brooks found that there were genuine disputes of fact of whether a
trucking company was requiring its truck drivers to be on-duty at all times
while on the road.233 First, this Section of the Note will briefly discuss the
factual background of Browne.234 Next, it will discuss the conflicts between
the Department of Transportation (DOT) and DOL guidelines and why these
conflicts require truck drivers to be on-duty for periods of twenty-four hours
or more. Finally, this Section will discuss sleeper berths and why employers’ inability to provide truck drivers with an adequate sleeping facility, in
conjunction with truck drivers being on-duty for periods of twenty-four
hours or more, should entitle drivers to compensation for every hour they
are on the road.
A.

The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas’s Finding in Browne

P.A.M.’s requirement that their truck drivers remain responsible for the
truck, the trailer, and cargo security, despite a driver technically being offduty, raises serious questions as to whether they should be considered “always on duty for the purposes compensability.”235 If truck drivers were always on-duty, it would enable truck drivers to receive compensation for
227. 29 C.F.R. § 778.108 (2020).
228. WAGE AND HOUR HANDBOOK, supra note 216.
229. Baouch, 908 F.3d at 1119.
230. 29 U.S.C. § 206.
231. 26 C.F.R. § 1.62-2(h)(1) (2021) (“[T]he amounts treated as paid under an accountable plan are not wages and are not subject to withholding and payment of employment taxes.”).
232. Baouch, 908 F.3d at 1118.
233. Browne v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 434 F. Supp. 3d 712, 721 (W.D. Ark. 2020).
234. Id.
235. Id.
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every hour they are on the road, if their employers require them to be responsible for their truck, trailer, and cargo at all times.236
P.A.M.’s policy will potentially result in the drivers being entitled to
sixteen hours of compensation at minimum wage if it is found that they require their truck drivers to be responsible for the cargo at all times.237 Additionally, there are regulations, separate from any company’s policy, that
require truck drivers to always be on duty. In essence, truck drivers should
be entitled to continuous compensation while on the road, based on the proceeding arguments.238
B.

DOT Regulations Require Truck Drivers to be On-Duty at All Times

First, it is important to note that the DOT only defines “on-duty,”239
while the DOL only defines “off-duty;”240 and the two definitions are contradictory. The DOT regulations state that a driver is “on-duty” when the
driver begins to work, or his employer requires him to be ready to work.241
The DOT excludes, within its definition of off-duty, any time that a truck
driver is in the sleeper berth242 or up to three hours riding in the passenger
seat after being in the sleeper berth.243
By contrast, the DOL defines “off-duty” as a period in which the employee is able to use his time for his own purposes.244 An employee is not
considered off-duty under DOL regulations “unless he is definitely told in
advance that he may leave the job and that he will not have to commence
work until a definitely specified hour has arrived.”245
The DOT regulations leave out any mention of the truck driver being
able to effectively use the time for his or her own purposes.246 The DOT’s
regulations define “on-duty time” as “the time a driver . . . is required to be
in readiness to work until the time the driver is relieved from work and all
responsibility for performing247 work.”248 The preceding regulation does not
236. See id.
237. Id.
238. See supra Part.IV.B, C.
239. 49 C.F.R. § 395.2 (2020).
240. 29 C.F.R. § 785.16 (2020).
241. 49 C.F.R. § 395.2 (2020).
242. Id. § 395.2(4)(ii).
243. Id. § 395.2(4)(iii).
244. 29 C.F.R. § 785.16(a) (2020).
245. Id.
246. Id. § 785.16.
247. PERFORM, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/perform (last visited Aug. 13, 2020) (“[T]o carry out an action or pattern of behavior.”).
248. 49 C.F.R. § 395.2 (2020).
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capture P.A.M.’s requirement that drivers remain responsible for their truck,
trailer, and cargo security,249 or if it does, a majority of the trucking industry
would be in violation of the hours of service regulations.250 If truck drivers
are to be responsible for the cargo they are carrying, even when they are in
their sleeping berths, they are unable to effectively use that time for their
own purposes.251
Furthermore, conflicts arise between state statutes and DOL and DOT
regulations. The DOT states that “[e]very motor carrier and its employees
must be knowledgeable of and comply with the requirements and specifications of this part.”252 For example, DOT regulations require that “[a]ll lamps
required by this subpart shall be capable of being operated at all times.”253
Some states, like Arkansas, go further by penalizing the failure to have
lamps equipped at all times in a proper condition as a misdemeanor offense.254 This penalty can be enforced even if the vehicle is unattended and
parked adjacent to a roadway.255 DOT regulations also specify that “all
brakes with which a motor vehicle is equipped must at all times be capable
of operating.”256 DOT regulations further state that “[t]he parking brake system shall, at all times, be capable of being applied by either the driver’s
muscular effort or by spring action.”257
Truck drivers are never truly off duty because they are required by
DOT regulations to ensure their lights,258 brakes,259 and parking brakes260 are
operable at all times. Truck drivers can be fined by the State for failing to
ensure these parts are working.261 Despite the truck drivers having to be
aware that these parts of their trucks are always working, the DOT does not
count the time doing so against the truck drivers’ hours of service.262 However, the truck driver is never completely relieved from duty and able to
effectively use the time for his or her own purposes.263
249. Browne v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 434 F. Supp. 3d 712, 721 (W.D. Ark. 2020).
250. See 49 C.F.R. § 395.3 (2020).
251. See id.
252. 49 C.F.R. § 393.1(b)(1) (2020) (intending part to mean § 393.1 et. seq., parts, and
accessories necessary for safe operation).
253. 49 C.F.R. § 393.9(a) (2021) (emphasis added).
254. ARK CODE ANN. § 27-36-101 (West 2021).
255. Id. § 27-36-206(a) (West 2021).
256. 49 C.F.R. § 393.48 (2020) (emphasis added).
257. Id. § 393.41 (2020) (emphasis added); see also 49 C.F.R. § 397.5 (2020) (providing
that a truck carrying certain types of hazardous materials must be attended by the driver at all
times).
258. 49 C.F.R. § 393.9(a) (2020).
259. Id. § 393.48 (2020) (emphasis added).
260. 49 C.F.R. § 393.41 (2020) (emphasis added).
261. ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-36-101 (West 2021); id. § 27-36-206(a) (West 2021).
262. See 49 C.F.R. § 395.2 (2020).
263. See id.
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Therefore, truck drivers should be subject to the regulations describing
the requirements for employees who are required to be on-duty for twentyfour hours or more.264 The regulations governing employees required to be
on service for twenty-four hours or more explicitly state that “[a]ny work
which an employee is required to perform while traveling must, of course,
be counted as hours worked.”265 Truck drivers should be entitled to the minimum wage for every hour they are away from home. The only exception to
this standard should be implied or express agreements between the employer
and truck driver that eight hours of work a day will be excluded if the truck
driver is provided with an adequate sleep facility.266
C.

Sleeper Berths Are Not Adequate Sleeping Facilities

The following argument assumes that truck drivers are always on-duty,
as described previously.267 The DOL has requirements employers must follow if their employees are required to be on-duty for longer than twentyfour hours.268 Of greatest significance is the provision permitting employees
that are required to be on service for twenty-four hours or more to agree to
exclude eight hours a day from compensation if the employer provides adequate sleeping facilities.269 No more than eight hours can be credited, even if
the sleeping period extends beyond eight hours.270 Also, the employee must
be able to enjoy a reasonable amount of sleep.271 If the employee is unable to
get at least five hours of sleep, then the employee must be paid for the entire
twenty-four-hour period.272
Employees must be paid for all the time they are required to be at
work, even sleeping hours, under the FLSA.273 The DOL had previously
264. 29 C.F.R. § 785.22 (2020); see also Browne v. P.A.M Transp., 434 F. Supp. 3d 712,
722 (W.D. Ark. 2020).
265. 29 C.F.R. § 785.41 (2020).
266. See 29 C.F.R. § 785.22 (2020).
267. See supra Part IV.B. But see Petrone v. Werner Enters., No. 8:11 CV307, 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 218981 at *28, *34–38, *45 (D. Neb. Feb. 2, 2017) (disregarding the DOL
handbook because it contradicted 24-hour-on-duty regulations, yet holding that truck drivers
are usually not on-duty while in their sleeper berths); Nance v. May Trucking Co., No. 3:12cv-01655-HZ, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5520 at *16–23 (D. Or. Jan. 15, 2014) (assumed truck
drivers are always on-duty but held truck driver trainees are barred compensation for sleeper
berth time as a matter of law), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 685 Fed. Appx. 602 (9th Cir.
2017).
268. See 29 C.F.R. § 785.22 (2020).
269. Id. § 785.22(a) (2020).
270. Id.
271. Id. § 785.22(b) (2020).
272. Id.
273. Giguere v. Port Res. Inc., 927 F.3d 43, 47 (1st Cir. 2019) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 785.7
(2021)).
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issued guidance stating that “[b]ecause the WHD (Wage and Hour Division)
regulations classify sleeper berth time as non-working travel time, rather
than on-duty sleeping time, such time is presumptively off-duty and not
compensable.”274 However, the DOL had improperly assumed that a sleeper
berth is an adequate sleeping facility275 and that truck drivers are relieved of
all duties and responsibilities while in the sleeping berth.276 The Field Operations Handbook for the Wage and Hour Division of the U.S. Department
of Labor states that “[b]erths in trucks are regarded as adequate sleeping
facilities for the purposes of 29 CFR § 785.41 and 29 CFR § 785.22.”277
Multiple courts have relied, at least in part, on this language in the DOL
handbook to deny truck drivers wages for the time spent in their sleeper
berths.278
The phrase “adequate sleeping facility” has never been defined by the
courts. In Plummer v. Harvester War Depot, Inc., the court held that employees were not entitled to compensation for sleep time because they “were
getting sleep in the same manner as if they were at home[.]”279 The Eighth
Circuit found that “suitable sleeping and living quarters” existed where
“comfortable beds, blankets, bed linens, and laundry services were provided
for the sleeping quarters.”280 The Seventh Circuit held that the sleep time for
employees was non-compensable in part because “[t]he sleeping quarters
consisted of large rooms with wooden or iron beds and mattresses.”281 Nei274. Opinion Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Lab., Wage & Hour Div., (July 22, 2019) (withdrawn on Jan. 26, 2021) [hereinafter DOL Opinion Letter].
275. Id. (stating drivers and assistants are off-duty when permitted to sleep in adequate
facilities, such as a sleeper berth).
276. Id.
277. U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., WAGE & HOUR DIV., FIELD OPERATIONS HANDBOOK,
§31(b)(09)(a) (Nov. 17, 2016), http://www.dol.gov/whd/FOH/FOH_Ch31.pdf.
278. Petrone v. Werner Enters., No. 8:12CV307, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218981, at *28–
30 (D. Neb. Feb. 2, 2017) (relying also on the Hour of Service requirement under 49 C.F.R. §
395.2 defining “‘on-duty time’ as ‘all time from the time a driver begins to work or is required to be in readiness to work until the time the driver is relieved from work and all responsibility for performing work[,]’” as well as 49 C.F.R. 395.3(a)(3)).
279. Plummer v. Harvester War Depot, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 495, 496 (N.D. Ohio 1947)
(dismissing firemen-plaintiff’s action to recover overtime under FLSA for the ten hours of
rest time provided by their employer).
280. Bridgeman v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, Inc., 161 F.2d 962, 963 (8th Cir. 1947) (affirming the judgment of the district court that held that appellant-firemen were not entitled to
overtime for an eight-hour rest period, despite being required to stay at the fire station, because they were “free to sleep, eat and engage in recreational activities of their own choosing”).
281. Bowers v. Remington Rand, Inc., 159 F.2d 114, 115 (7th Cir. 1946) (affirming the
district court’s opinion against appellant-fireman seeking overtime compensation for sleep
time because the firemen had “agreed to wait to be engaged,” and therefore “were willing to
keep themselves available for duty if called upon during their rest period, [and] they were
willing in consideration of their employment as firemen to sleep on the premises”).
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ther the Eighth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit, nor the Ohio court defined an
adequate facility but only implied what they considered adequate.
Despite the legal system’s inability to determine what necessitates an
adequate sleeping facility, multiple scientific studies have shown that sleeper berths negatively impact the “quality and depth of sleep[.]”282 All truck
drivers experience conditions adverse to quality sleep. Team drivers receive
an even lower quality of sleep than solo drivers because team-driven trucks
are in constant motion.283 Studies have established that “the noise and motion environment in the sleeper berth degraded . . . drivers’ sleep.”284 Studies
revealed that truck drivers are “often forced to sleep during rest times along
noisy motorways[,]” which exposes the drivers to sleep disturbances.285 The
engine noise and lights from passing vehicles have been found to have a
negative impact on truck drivers’ health.286 An Australian study of fatigue in
truck drivers found that truck drivers get more hours of sleep and a better
quality of sleep when they are at home in contrast to sleeping in their
trucks.287 However, one study concluded that despite truck drivers sleeping
nearly an hour longer when at home,288 there were “only minor deviations in
sleep quality associated with the use of sleeper berths.”289
The DOL’s guidance that sleeper berths are considered adequate sleeping facilities290 is in direct conflict with existing case law.291 Scientific studies show a direct negative correlation between sleeper berths and sleep quality.292 The courts suggest that adequate sleeping facilities require comfortable beds,293 large sleeping quarters,294 or at the very least, the same manner
of sleep one could get at home.295 Therefore, it is unlikely that any truck
282. THOMAS A. DINGUS ET AL., IMPACT OF SLEEPER BERTH USAGE ON DRIVER FATIGUE
188
(Nov.
2001)
https://vtechworks.lib.vt.edu/bitstream/handle/10919/55096/
PB2002107930.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Roland FJ Popp, et al., Impact of Overnight Traffic Noise on Sleep Quality, Sleepiness, and Vigilant Attention in Long-Haul Truck Drivers: Results of a Pilot Study, 17 NOISE
& HEALTH 387, 388 (2015).
286. See id.
287. Stuard D. Baulk & Adam Fletcher, At Home and Away: Measuring the Sleep of
Australian Truck Drivers, 45 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 36, 36–38 (2012) (Supp.
Mar. 2012).
288. David Darwent et al., How Well Do Truck Drivers Sleep in Cabin Sleeper Berths?,
43 APPLIED ERGONOMICS 442, 445 (2012).
289. See id. at 446.
290. DOL Opinion Letter, supra note 274.
291. See Bridgeman v. Ford, Bacon & Davis, Inc., 161 F.2d 962, 963 (8th Cir. 1947).
292. DINGUS ET AL., supra note 282.
293. Bridgeman, 161 F.2d at 963.
294. Bowers v. Remington Rand, Inc., 159 F.2d 114, 115 (7th Cir. 1946).
295. Plummer v. Harvester War Depot, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 495, 496 (N.D. Ohio 1947).
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driver “is permitted to sleep in adequate facilities furnished by the employer.”296 Sleeper berths are not adequate facilities, and truck drivers should be
entitled to hourly compensation for every hour spent away from home.297
VI.

ARKANSAS CAN ENSURE TRANSPORTATION EMPLOYEES ARE PAID
OVERTIME

Haskell Fuller’s and Micah Lindsey’s experience has been replicated
across the country, which has led some state legislatures to take action.298 In
Colorado, Michael Combs, a Jaguar Energy Services, LLC. employee, was
responsible for loading trucks and performing duties as a driver helper.299
The Tenth Circuit denied Mr. Comb’s claim for overtime,300 despite the undisputed fact that his employer never required him to perform work outside
of Colorado’s borders.301 First, this Section will briefly describe the action
taken by Colorado to resolve the abusive and broad interpretation of the
MCA exemption. Next, it will explore other states’ statutory codes, illustrating how far some states have gone to protect their workers against the MCA
exemption, contrasted with how little some other states have acted. Lastly, it
will identify the authority Arkansas’s legislature can use to protect its transportation employees and propose a solution that will resolve this issue.
A.

Colorado’s Response to Combs v. Jaguar Energy Services

Prior to Mr. Combs being denied overtime,302 the Colorado Division of
Labor had published a wage order that separately defined interstate and intrastate drivers.303 The wage order only allowed drivers whose employers
directed them to cross state lines to be covered by the MCA exemption to
the overtime requirements of the FLSA.304

296. 29 C.F.R. § 785.41 (2020); 29 C.F.R. § 785.22 (2020).
297. See generally supra text accompanying notes at 289–95.
298. See In re Two Men & a Truck Litig., No. 5:16-CV-05255, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26017, at *17–18 (denying overtime under the MCA exemption to loader employees who
never left the state of Arkansas).
299. Combs v. Jaguar Energy Servs., LLC, 683 F.App’x. 704, 705 (10th Cir. 2017).
300. Id. at 708.
301. Compare id. at 705, with supra case cited in note 129.
302. Combs, 683 F. App’x. at 708.
303. Brunson v. Colo. Cab Co., LLC, 433 P.3d 93, 95, 100 (Colo. App. 2018) (citing
Colo. Minimum Wage Order Number 31, 7 CRR 1103-1 (Jan. 1, 2010),
https://cdle.colorado.gov/sites/cdle/files/Minimum%20Wage%20Order%2031.pdf).
304. Id.
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However, the wage order failed to include loaders,305 leading the state
to adopt the Colorado Overtime and Minimum Pay Standards Order #36 that
includes employees, covered by the MCA exemption, who cross the state
lines during the course of their work.306 If this order had been effective when
Mr. Combs was employed by Jaguar Energy Services, LLC., the new standard adopted by Colorado should have entitled him to the overtime compensation he claimed.307
B.

The Other Forty-Eight States

Chapter 8 of the FLSA states that “[n]o provision of this chapter or of
any order thereunder shall excuse noncompliance with any Federal or State
law or municipal ordinance establishing a minimum wage higher than the
minimum wage established under this chapter or a maximum work week
lower than the maximum workweek established under this chapter.”308
Courts have interpreted this to mean that state overtime laws can cover even
workers exempted by the FLSA.309
Multiple states do not have overtime laws on the books and rely upon
the Federal Government to protect their employees.310 Multiple other states,
including Arkansas, have the same exemptions as the FLSA.311 The remaining states have made some progress in ensuring truck drivers receive overtime pay. Alaska, for example, requires that truckers be paid under a system
comparable to overtime for hours worked in excess of forty hours a week or
over eight hours a day.312 Washington has a similar statute stating that truck
drivers are exempt from the overtime provision, but only if “the compensation system under which the truck driver is paid includes overtime pay for
work in excess of 40 hours a week or for more than eight hours a day[.]”313
305. Combs, 683 F. App’x. at 706; see Colo. Minimum Wage Order Number 31, 7 CRR
1103-1 (Jan. 1, 2010), https://cdle.colorado.gov/sites/cdle/files/Minimum%20Wage%20
Order%2031.pdf.
306. 7 COLO. CODE. REGS. § 1103-1, 2.2.6(A) (Lexis 2020).
307. Compare id., with Combs, 683 F. App’x. at 706–08.
308. 29 U.S.C. § 218(a).
309. See, e.g., Williams v. W.M.A. Transit Co., 472 F.2d 1258, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Pettis Moving Co. v. Roberts, 784 F.2d 439, 441–42 (2nd Cir. 1986) (holding that § 218(a) of
the FLSA allows states to set overtime provisions because the MCA only regulates safety and
should not be allowed to preempt states from exercising their traditional powers of economic
regulation).
310. Noah A. Finkel, The Fair Labor Standards Act: State Wage-and-Hour Law Class
Actions: The Real Wave of “FLSA” Litigation?, 7 EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL’Y J. 159, 163
(2003).
311. See statutes cited supra note 38.
312. ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.060(15) (2020).
313. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.46.130(2)(f) (West 2020); see also Bostain v. Food
Express, Inc., 153 P.3d 846, 858 (Wash. 2007) (holding that truck drivers employed in state
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The State of New Mexico does not have an MCA exemption314 and requires truck drivers to be paid overtime for hours worked in excess of forty
hours a week.315 Massachusetts requires employers to pay overtime payments to loaders and driver helpers for any time they are not “on a truck.” 316
Connecticut allows loaders to collect overtime, but not drivers or driver
helpers.317
Even New York has made progress towards fair compensation for truck
drivers. New York courts historically had dismissed overtime complaints by
truck drivers318 despite a DOL Opinion from 2010 stating that even employees who satisfy the requirements of the MCA exemption were due overtime
wages.319 Likewise, New York’s overtime statute requires that employees
covered by the MCA exemption must be paid overtime.320 In April 2020, the
Second Circuit weighed in and determined that truck drivers employed in
New York are due overtime pay if they work over forty hours a week.321
C.

What Action Can Arkansas Take to Protect Its Transportation Employees?

The Arkansas General Assembly could update its statutory code in
multiple ways to protect transportation employees. At a minimum, language
similar to that used in Colorado or Massachusetts should be used to enable
trucking industry employees working entirely within the borders of Arkansas to collect the overtime pay they are due. Ensuring trucking industry em-

of Washington are due overtime regardless of how many hours they spend driving in other
states).
314. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 50-4-22(E) (West 2020).
315. Id.
316. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151, § 1A(8) (West 2020) ( “[T]his section shall not be
applicable to any employee who is employed . . . as a driver or helper on a truck with respect
to whom the Interstate Commerce Commission has power to establish qualifications and
maximum hours of service” from overtime pay).
317. Overnite Transp. Co. v. Tianti, 926 F.2d 220, 221–22 (2d Cir. 1991); see also CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 31-76i (West 2021).
318. See, e.g., Chaohui Tang v. Wing Keung Enters., 210 F. Supp. 3d 376, 410–11
(E.D.N.Y. 2016); Kennedy v. Equity Transp. Co., No. 1:14-CV-0864, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
143565 at *21.
319. New York State Dep’t of Lab., Opinion Letter, RO-10-0025 (June 30, 2010),
https://statistics.labor.ny.gov/legal/counsel/pdf/Overtime/RO-10-0025.pdf.
320. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 12, § 142-2.2 (2021).
321. Hayward v. IBI Armored Servs., 954 F.3d 573, 576 (2d Cir. 2020) (holding that
New York Labor Law “clearly states that for employees who are exempt from the FLSA
under the Motor Carrier Exemption, employers must provide overtime compensation at a rate
of one and one-half times the minimum wage”).
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ployees are paid what they are due prevents future unjust outcomes similar
to Haskell Fuller and Micah Lindsay’s experience.322
Furthermore, Arkansas could follow in the footsteps of Alaska and
Washington and amend § 11-4-211(d) to exempt employees only if their
gross pay is equivalent to what they would have earned if they had been
paid overtime. Even better, Arkansas could remove the MCA exemption
from the books entirely and redact the language in § 11-4-211(d) that allows
an exemption based on 29 U.S.C. §213(b)(1).323 Any of these options are
preferable to the current system.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Congress never intended to exempt truck drivers working over forty
hours a week from overtime. At the very least, courts should stop cherrypicking the relevant statutes and enforce the MCA exemption to allow truck
drivers to exclude per diem reimbursements from their wages. Considering
Arkansas’s unique position of having the highest concentration of trucking
industry jobs in the United States,324 it should place itself at the forefront of
the battle to provide fair labor standards to these essential employees. There
is also an economic incentive for the state to provide fair labor standards,
since providing fair and legal compensation will increase the marketability
of Arkansas for truck drivers.
Arkansas must act to protect its transportation employees from the
egregious judicial abuse described throughout this Note by changing its own
code, either by allowing employees who never leave the state for their jobs
to be protected by our current overtime laws or extending coverage to all
employees currently exempted by the MCA exemption. Arkansas should
also rectify the current trucking industry’s sweatshop nature and amend its
statutes to ensure truck drivers are compensated for every hour they are
away from home unless they are sleeping in an employer-paid hotel room.
Not only will this provide truck drivers with adequate sleeping accommodations, but it will provide them with a better night’s sleep and will likely result in fewer fatalities on the roads and interstates within its borders.

322. See In re Two Men & a Truck Litig., No. 5:16-CV-05255, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26017 *16–17 (W.D. Ark. Feb. 24, 2017).
323. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 11-4-211(d) (West 2021).
324. AM. TRANSP. RSCH. INST., supra note 22.
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